Situating medical and scientific research within a framework or theory of social justice is long overdue. Attempting to extend principles of research ethics beyond the clinic and lab to other affected people or consequences tolerates or obfuscates injustice. While it must be done, the timescales, methodologies, and commitment to real-world impact are quite different in research ethics versus political philosophy.This essay considers the issue of informed consent as it arose in the context of 1960s living kidney donors.  https://www.selleckchem.com/products/gyy4137.html  In one of the earliest empirical inquiries into informed consent, psychiatrists Carl H. Fellner and John R. Marshall interviewed donors about their decision-making process and their experience and reflections on donorship. In their much-cited 1970 paper, the physicians reported that living donors, rather than reaching a reasoned, intellectual, and unemotional decision about donating a kidney (as stipulated in the Ethical Guidelines for Organ Transplantation issued by the American Medical Association's Judicial Council), instead made instantaneous and "irrational" decisions about participation. Fellner and Marshall's studies contributed to the public debate and professional discussion about the moral and ethical dimensions of donorship, even as they challenged the developing consensus on informed consent.In Speaking for the Dying Life-and-Death Decisions in Intensive Care, Susan Shapiro attempts to penetrate and organize the chaotic communications between physicians and family members who are making medical decisions for people who have lost the capacity to make their own medical decisions. The work is based on observations undertaken by Shapiro and a coresearcher of one thousand encounters between physicians and the family members of two hundred patients too sick to participate. Their ethnographic work, which is both traditional and innovative, leads to stunning findings. They reveal an inadequacy among surrogates that is undeniable, vast, and potentially tragic-if measured by the questionable standard of adhering to the patient's preferences. Further confirming research would be helpful, but what Shapiro has recognized already should shake the foundations of advance care planning.The speed and scale of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the limits of current health systems and the potential promise of non-establishment research such as "DIY" research. We consider one example of how DIY research is responding to the pandemic, discuss the challenges faced by DIY research more generally, and suggest that a "trust architecture" should be developed now to contribute to successful future DIY efforts.The lead article in the Hastings Center Report's November-December 2020 issue reconsiders the rationale for requiring that patients have a prescription from a physician to obtain a drug. Madison Kilbride, Steve Joffe, and Holly Fernandez Lynch conclude that growing respect for patient autonomy should lead to a new default for drug access drugs should be available over the counter unless there are special concerns about harms to third parties or about patients' ability to make decisions for themselves. This conclusion would be a substantial reorientation of drug policy in the United States. Bioethics at a societal level is a theme in the second article, "The Social Risks of Science," and throughout the issue.Madison Powers and Ruth Faden's book Structural Injustice Power, Advantage, and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2019), is an invaluable contribution to help us grasp the contemporary ills of our nonideal world. The authors' general claim is that the concept of structural injustice allows us to identify the causes and social processes leading to the violation of human rights and the production of unfair systems of disadvantage and privilege. Building on Powers and Faden's well-known thesis that social justice is concerned with the achievement of a sufficient level of well-being, the book delves into an in-depth discussion of their conceptual framework, incorporating concrete examples to illustrate their analysis.When new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the default assumption is that they will be available by prescription only, safe for use exclusively under clinical supervision. The paternalism underlying this default must be interrogated in order to ensure appropriate respect for patient autonomy. Upon closer inspection, prescription requirements are justified when nonprescription status would risk harm to third parties and when a large segment of the population would struggle to exercise their autonomy in using a drug safely and effectively on their own. Although these justifications can support prescription status for many drugs, we propose that reversing the FDA's current default to instead begin with a presumption in favor of over-the-counter status is the best way to avoid interference with valid claims of patient autonomy. Under this approach, a range of drug products could be considered for an OTC switch, including oral contraceptives, statins, and HIV-prevention drugs.How do we balance the rights of aging physicians against the right of the public to competent health care? This version of a classic public health ethics dilemma is here now and likely to increase as the population ages. Peer review has long been the standard mechanism for assessing physician competence, but it is subjective and too easily subverted. New options are needed, both in medicine and throughout the professions, but they are challenging to implement. Physicians have an ethical obligation to protect the health of the public by acknowledging, assessing, and addressing the cognitive effects of aging on medical competence.Many instances of scientific research impose risks, not just on participants and scientists but also on third parties. This class of social risks unifies a range of problems previously treated as distinct phenomena, including so-called bystander risks, biosafety concerns arising from gain-of-function research, the misuse of the results of dual-use research, and the harm caused by inductive risks. The standard approach to these problems has been to extend two familiar principles from human subjects research regulations-a favorable risk-benefit ratio and informed consent. We argue, however, that these moral principles will be difficult to satisfy in the context of widely distributed social risks about which affected parties may reasonably disagree. We propose that framing these risks as political rather than moral problems may offer another way. By borrowing lessons from political philosophy, we propose a framework that unifies our discussion of social risks and the possible solutions to them.