https://www.selleckchem.com/products/mm3122.html Is health care "special"? That is, do we have moral reason to treat health care differently from how we treat other sorts of social goods? Intuitively, perhaps, we might think the proper response is "yes." However, to date, philosophers have often struggled to justify this idea-known as the "specialness thesis about health care" or STHC. In this article, I offer a new justification of STHC, one I take to be immune from objections that have undercut other defenses. Notably, unlike previous utility- and opportunity-based theories, I argue that we can find normative justification for STHC in what I term our special duty to assist those unable to help themselves. It is this duty, I argue, that ultimately gives us reason to treat health care differently from other sorts of goods (even other goods meeting health needs) and to distribute it independently of individuals' ability to pay.Effective altruism is a growing philosophical and social movement, whose members design their lives in ways aligned with doing the most good that they can do. The main focus of this paper is to explore what effective altruism has to say about the moral obligations people have to do good with their organs, in the face of an organ-shortage problem. It is argued that an effective altruism framework offers a number of valuable theoretical and practical insights relevant to ongoing debate about how to resolve the organ-shortage problem. Its recommendations constitute a plausible and promising strategy for increasing the supply of, and decreasing the demand for, human organs, in a way that protects (rather than ignores, or preys upon) the global poor. And, many of its recommendations can be implemented into policy without requiring that citizens actually become effective altruists themselves.Ronit Stahl and Ezekiel Emanuel have recently issued a stark challenge to conscience protections in medical law and ethics. Their argument is flawed, however. Th