Building on recent work in the sociology of intellectual interventions, the study of cultural boundaries of science, and the role of ideas in politics, the article develops a theory of public epistemologies as argumentative tools people use to support or oppose political positions. Two prominent public epistemologies that have recently crystallized in Italian politics are taken as illustrations, with special attention paid to the role of two academics (an economist and an immunologist) turned public intellectuals. The article argues that the rise of populism in Italy has contributed to unusual alignments between political and epistemological positions, which has made questions about science and expert knowledge much more relevant in contesting and supporting political decisions.COVID-19, which is rampant around the world, has seriously disrupted people's normal work and living.  https://www.selleckchem.com/products/capsazepine.html  To respond to public urgent needs such as COVID-19, emergency supplies are essential. However, due to the special requirements of supplies, when an emergency occurs, the supply reserve mostly cannot cope with the high demand. Given the importance of emergency supplies in public emergencies, rapid response manufacturing of emergency supplies is a necessity. The faster emergency supplies and facilities are manufactured, the more likely the pandemic can be controlled and the more human lives are saved. Besides, new generation information technology represented by cloud computing, IoT, big data, AI, etc. is rapidly developing and can be widely used to address such situations. Therefore, rapid response manufacturing enabled by New IT is presented to quickly meet emergency demands. And some policy suggestions are presented.Almost half of children who contract covid-19 may have lasting symptoms, which should factor into decisions on reopening schools, reports Helen Thomson.Scientists have begun the race to create a single vaccine that protects us from all future coronaviruses, with human trials starting soon, finds Graham Lawton.Countless contracts have been undermined by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 as well as government orders to contain it. Flights have been canceled, concerts have been called off, and dorms have been closed, just to name a few. Do these all count as breaches of contract-or are the parties excused due to the extraordinary circumstances? And how should the losses be allocated between the parties? The law provides one set of answers to these questions; ethics offers another. With a focus on American law (developed over the past two centuries) and Jewish ethics (developed over millennia), this paper shows that the two systems are in accord with some respects and differ in others Both law and Jewish ethics would excuse a party who cannot complete his contract due to a force beyond his control, like the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet Jewish ethics would require that the excused party still be paid, while American law would not.The party autonomy doctrine represents a very central component of international commerce. According to this doctrine, the parties to an international contract have the freedom to determine the applicable law to govern their dispute. Thus, party autonomy becomes a significant doctrine that affects the nature and effect of cross-border commercial transactions. Furthermore, the doctrine plays a crucial role in addressing the legal challenges caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 and the growing volume of online commerce that COVID-19 reality has enhanced. By taking Australia as a case study for the party autonomy doctrine, we explore the essential aspects of the doctrine and contemplate on what the future of this doctrine holds for businesses and consumers.While a large body of literature shows that car share encourages low car ownership, the evidence is rather limited in the context of different types of car share (fleet-based versus peer-to-peer) and geographic settings (inner versus middle suburbs). This study was an in-depth investigation of the impact of (round-trip) car share on ownership, including forgone or delayed purchasing across different car share systems. An online survey was conducted with car share members (n = 651) and non-members (n = 290) in Melbourne, Australia. All respondents had a shared car available within a 10-min walk of their home. The first part of the paper compared member and non-member householders (socio-demographically and geographically adjusted) and found that members owned significantly fewer cars than non-members. In the second part of the paper, a quasi-longitudinal comparison of car share members was conducted. One in three households reduced car ownership, and most reductions occurred in the year prior to joining car share. Fleet-based car share members reported a larger reduction in car ownership compared to peer-to-peer car share members. Residents of inner and middle suburbs of Melbourne reported similar "net" reductions in car ownership, the reasons differed. Residents in densely populated inner suburbs used car share to avoid or delay car ownership while middle suburb residents used car share to avoid purchasing a second car. Findings provide valuable insights for transport policy settings which have the potential to influence car share availability and thereby support broader policy objectives to reduce dependency on private car ownership and use.Recent events, most notably the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, have made it increasingly apparent that liquidity is synonymous with corporate survival. In this paper, we explore how governments can fulfill an important need as suppliers of liquidity. Building on the financing advantage view of state ownership, we theorize how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may provide capital by offering trade credit to customer firms. The data indicate a positive relation between the level of state ownership and the provision of trade credit. Using an institution-focused framework, we further determine that the nation's institutional environment systematically affects the opportunities and motivations for SOEs to grant trade credit. Specifically, we find that SOEs grant more trade credit in countries with less developed financial markets, weaker legal protection of creditors, less comprehensive information-sharing mechanisms, more collectivist societies, left-wing governments, and higher levels of unemployment.