https://www.selleckchem.com/products/ot-82.html In 'Dilemma for Appeals to the Moral Significance of Birth', we argued that a dilemma is faced by those who believe that birth is the event at which infanticide is ruled out. Those who reject the moral permissibility of infanticide by appeal to the moral significance of birth must either accept the moral permissibility of a late-term abortion for a non-therapeutic reason or not. If they accept it, they need to account for the strong intuition that her decision is wrong as well as deny the underlying normative principle that killing a viable fetus requires good reason, and not wanting to care for the child when the child could be easily placed for adoption is not a good enough reason to abort. If they reject the moral permissibility of the late-term abortion, they need to explain why her decision is wrong. Doing so, however, will undermine their own project of denying infanticide by appeal to birth. Walter Veit argues that the dilemma relies too much on intuition and does not live up to biological continuity. We explain why his criticisms are unconvincing.Animal ethics committees (AECs) typically focus on the welfare of animals used in experiments, neglecting the potential welfare impact of that animal use on the animal laboratory personnel. Some of this work, particularly the killing of animals, can impose significant psychological burdens that can diminish the well-being of laboratory animal personnel, as well as their capacity to care for animals. We propose that AECs, which regulate animal research in part on the basis of reducing harm, can and ought to require that these harms to researchers are reduced as well. The paper starts by presenting evidence of these burdens and their harm, giving some examples showing how they may be mitigated. We then argue that AECs are well placed to account for these harms to personnel and ought to use their power to reduce their occurrence. We conclude by responding to four potentia